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Abstract
An optimization model is used to evaluate the implications of single-desk selling of Canadian barley for
trade flows and producer welfare.  Effects on U.S. imports and barley prices are also considered.  
Key words: Canadian Wheat Board, barley, price discrimination, grain trade. 1
Single-Desk Selling of Canadian Barley  
1. Introduction
The Canadian Wheat Board markets all Canadian barley for human consumption (malting) or
export.  Single-desk selling by the CWB has been a contentious issue in Canada, as well as a source of
trade friction between Canada and the United States.   Within Canada, debate has centered on whether
single-desk selling works to the advantage of producers.  The CWB claims to practice price
discrimination in international barley markets and thereby raise average returns for Canadian producers. 
However, critics dispute the CWB’s ability to exert market power in barley and point to various costs
and inefficiencies associated with board control.  The role of the CWB is also of interest to U.S.
producers and policymakers, as Canada has exported increasing amounts of barley to the United
States in recent years.       
Most Canadian barley is consumed domestically as livestock feed and falls outside of direct
CWB control.  This makes the situation of barley somewhat different from that of wheat, the other grain
marketed by the CWB.  To attract barley into the price pooling system, the CWB must offer a
prospective return that is competitive with the domestic feed market.  Pool returns are essentially
weighted averages of CWB sale prices, with deductions for marketing and transportation costs.            
This paper uses a quantitative model to examine the trade and welfare effects of single-desk
selling of Canadian barley.  The model, adapted from Schmitz et al. (1997), is developed from the
perspective of the CWB, which seeks to maximize board sales for three different types of barley (feed,
2-row malting, and 6-row malting) within a single marketing year.  Revenues from CWB sales are
pooled by barley type.  Arbitrage conditions ensure that pool returns are at least as great as the2
domestic feed barley price. 
The analysis is focused on two ongoing debates.  The first concerns the ability of the CWB to
extract additional revenue for Canadian producers through price discrimination in international markets. 
In the absence of the U.S. EEP program, which provided targeted export subsidies for barley, there
may be much less scope for differential pricing by the CWB.  This is an area of sensitivity analysis in
model simulations.  Bounds are placed on price spreads between regions; as these are tightened, the
potential gains from Canadian price discrimination are reduced.  The second debate concerns the
alleged ‘systemic inefficiencies’ associated with board control.  A marketing cost parameter,
representing the extra costs incurred by producers because of single-desk selling, is varied in model
simulations in order to illustrate the effects on trade flows and welfare.  
The next section provides a brief overview of the analytical model.  Results are presented in the
third section, and the paper concludes with a discussion of implications.     
2. Overview of the Model
The analytical model is a modified version of that presented by Schmitz et al. (1997).  It adopts
the perspective of the Canadian Wheat Board, seeking to maximize board sales revenue for three
different types of barley (feed, 2-row malting, and 6-row malting) within a single marketing year. 
Revenues from CWB sales are pooled by barley type.  Arbitrage conditions ensure that pool returns
are at least as great as the domestic feed barley price.  Barley demand is differentiated by type and
region, and the CWB is assumed to practice price discrimination.  Canadian barley supplies are taken
as fixed, although quantities marketed by the CWB are endogenous.  Supply and demand parameters1That is the only year for which complete data are available.   A limitation of the following
analysis is that it does not reflect current market conditions.  
2This estimate includes the direct cost of CWB administration ($1.75/mt), and costs due to
marketing inefficiency ($12.4 - 14.4/mt).  It does not include costs of delayed varietal development or
increased costs of farm management.  See Carter, Loyns and Berwald, p. 319.  
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are representative of the 1991/92 marketing year.1   
Two modifications have been made to the model.  First, an upper bound (D) is placed on price
differences in CWB markets.  This is motivated by the claim by Carter (1993), among others, that the
CWB has limited ability to exert market power in international barley markets.  By varying the size of
the bound on price differences, the model can be used to simulate varying degrees of market power. 
Second, a marketing cost parameter (M) has been introduced.  This is intended to reflect higher
costs of barley marketing associated with single-desk selling.  Carter, Loyns, and Berwald (1998) have
identified extra costs on the order of C$ 16/mt for barley.2  To the extent that extra marketing costs are
borne by producers, the advantages of single-desk selling are diminished.  This will also be illustrated
through sensitivity analysis in model simulations.  
There are ten barley markets in the model.  In addition to domestic (Canadian) demand, the
model includes feed and malting barley demand in the United States, Japan, and offshore markets. 
Barley prices are measured at Canadian ports. 
Following Schmitz et al., two variants of the model were developed.  The first assumes single-
desk selling of Canadian barley, and the second assumes a competitive, multiple-seller environment.  By
comparing solutions for the two models, effects of single-desk selling on Canadian producer revenue,
prices, and trade flows can be estimated.  Complete mathematical specifications are omitted for space
reasons, but are available from the author.  4
3.  Model Results
Table 1 shows the impact of alternative parameter values for the single-desk seller model.  The
upper panel shows the impact on Canadian producer revenue.  Revenue impacts are expressed in
terms of deviations from the multiple-seller solution.  Thus, when M=0 and D=40, producer revenue is
C$95.8 million higher with single-desk selling than under multiple sellers.  These particular values
correspond to Schmitz et al. (1997), and are most favorable to the single-desk selling.  At the opposite
(bottom right) corner of the panel are parameter values least favorable to the CWB.  When M=16 and
D=0, single-desk selling results in C$160 million lower revenue relative to a competitive marketing
system.   Values in the bottom right more closely reflect the view of Carter and Loyns (1996); they
point to higher costs of board marketing and dispute the potential gains from price discrimination.
Other panels in Table 1 show the impacts of alternative parameter values on Canadian welfare,
U.S. welfare, and the CWB share of barley supply under single-desk selling.  Canadian welfare is
highest if the board has most pricing discretion (D=40) and no extra marketing costs attach to the
board system (M=0).  Canadian welfare is lowest if the board cannot price discriminate (D=0) and
marketing costs are high (M=16).  Differential impacts on U.S. welfare are fairly small.   Results
indicate that U.S. welfare is enhanced, to a small extent, by the board’s ability to price
discriminate—although net effects are still negative relative to the multiple sellers scenario.   The bottom
panel shows the proportion of Canadian barley marketed by the CWB, given different parameter
values.  This varies between 35.7 % (base case) and 28.7 %.   As expected, with higher marketing
costs and smaller bounds on price differences, smaller amounts of barley enter the pooling system.      
Because the U.S. welfare measure is derived from import demand, it does not convey the3In this context, it should be noted that Canada now has fewer import barriers than in 1991/92, the
base year for model simulations.  The fact that most Canadian malt producers are  now owned, wholly or
in part, by U.S. parent companies may create additional pressure for lower malting barley prices in
Canada.   See Buschena, Gray, and Severson (1998) for discussion of integration in the North American
malting sector.   
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impact of Canadian barley trade on U.S. producers.  U.S. producer welfare cannot be directly
measured in the context of the present model, which does not explicitly include U.S. barley supply. 
However, the model does generate information relevant for an assessment of likely welfare effects:
import volumes, import values, and prices.  Impacts of single-desk selling on these variables are shown
in Tables 2 and 3.  
Table 2 shows the effects of single-desk selling on aggregate U.S. barley imports.  As shown in
the upper panel, import volumes are highest under base-case conditions (D=40 and M=0).  Import
volumes are lowest when price differences are minimized and marketing costs are highest (D=0 and
M=16).   The negative relationship between marketing cost and U.S. import volume is not unexpected:
higher marketing costs reduce CWB sales generally, and not just in the United States.  It is less obvious
why the bound on price differences is positively related to U.S. barley imports.  The explanation lies in
inter-market price spreads, especially for malting barley.  U.S. malting barley prices are substantially
lower than Canada’s in the base case, and a narrowing of price spreads (lower value of D) requires
withholding malting barley from the lower-priced market.3   It is worth emphasizing that while single-
desk selling has little impact on total U.S. import volume under base-case assumptions, the effect is to
reduce U.S. imports if extra marketing costs are associated with board sales.
Additional detail on price effects can be found in Table 3.  As shown in the upper panel,  single-
desk selling tends to lower the U.S. feed barley price.  The impact is most pronounced for base-case4The magnitude of estimated price effects is influenced by assumptions underlying the multiple-
seller (competitive) scenario; particularly the C$15/mt spread between malting and feed barley.  To test
the importance of this assumption, an additional simulation was performed in which 2-row malting barley
was assumed to earn a C$30/mt premium to feed under multiple sellers.  Using this as the base for
comparison, simulation results for the single-desk selling model still show a net positive effect on U.S.
malting prices.  
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parameter values (D=40, M=0).  On the other hand, as shown in the middle and lower panels, U.S.
malting barley prices are higher as a result of Canada’s single-desk selling—and substantially so in the
case of 2-row malting barley.  This suggests that the CWB withholds malting barley from the U.S.
market, thereby raising the price above what would be observed in a multiple seller environment.4   The
estimated price impacts vary with parameter assumptions.  As the marketing cost parameter increases,
so does the U.S. barley price.  
These results provide a mixed message for U.S. producers.  While single-desk selling by
Canada appears to lower the U.S. feed barley price, it may also raise the U.S. malting barley price by
restraining trade flows that would otherwise occur.  And whatever the level of extra marketing costs
associated with single desk selling (and absorbed by Canadian producers), their impact on U.S. barley
prices is generally positive.      
4.  Summary and Discussion
One of the purported advantages of the CWB is its ability to earn higher returns for malting
barley compared to a multiple-seller environment.  Schmitz et al. (1997) quantified the impact of single-
desk selling on average prices received for malting barley: C$42/MT for 6-row varieties, and
C$34/MT for 2-row varieties, based on model simulations for ten marketing years.  Other studies,
notably Carter (1993), have pointed to the low Canadian selection rates for malting barley, and7
questioned whether Canadian producers would be better served by a deregulated marketing system.  
In Carter’s view, higher premiums for malting barley must be weighed against the cost of lost marketing
opportunities, particularly in the United States. 
Among economists, much of the debate about single-desk selling has revolved around two
issues.  The first concerns the ability of the CWB to exert market power and extract price premiums for
Canadian barley in export markets.  Carter (1993), for example, found demand for Canadian barley to
be extremely elastic in major offshore markets.  This would undermine the ability of the CWB to act a
price discriminating monopolist.  Schmitz et al. (1997) presented some empirical evidence on
differences in CWB export prices.  They found significant differences in fob prices paid for feed barley
in Japan, the United States, and the rest of the world, lending support to the claim of CWB price
discrimination.  However, their results were strongest for the period when the U.S. Export
Enhancement Program (EEP) was in effect.   In the absence of targeted subsidies by competing
exporters, the ability of the CWB to charge different prices in different markets may be severely
circumscribed.  
The second debate concerns the issue of systemic costs associated with single-desk selling. 
Carter and Loyns (1996), and Carter, Loyns and Berwald (1998) have identified numerous extra costs
in the Canadian grain handling, transportation, and marketing system which, they argue, are directly or
indirectly linked to the Canadian Wheat Board.  Higher marketing costs—possibly as high as
C$16/MT for barley— would lower the net return to Canadian producers and offset any advantages of
single-desk selling.  Defenders of the CWB dispute these estimates and the Board’s responsibility for
specific costs and inefficiencies.  There may be no way to resolve this debate short of major reforms in8
the Canadian system. 
These questions are of keen interest to U.S. producers and policymakers.  Canadian barley
exports to the United States have risen in recent years relative to historical averages, while U.S. barley
acres have declined.  It is natural to ask what effect single-desk selling of Canadian barley has had on
U.S. barley prices.  Northern-tier politicians have argued that the Canadian Wheat Board, as a state
trading enterprise (STE), enjoys an unfair competitive advantage in U.S. and international markets. 
Their presumption is that the CWB must therefore work to the disadvantage of U.S. producers.   
The analysis in this paper is based on a model of single-desk selling by the Canadian Wheat
Board.   The model, adapted from that of  Schmitz et al. (1997), includes both feed and malting barley,
ten distinct markets, price pooling, and a set of arbitrage conditions linking pool returns to the domestic
feed barley price.  The model includes two additional features—a bound on inter-market price
differences (D), and a marketing cost parameter (M)— which allow the diverse opinions on single-desk
selling to be represented analytically.   The benchmark for comparison is a ‘multiple seller’ model, in
which prices are equalized (fob Canadian ports) across markets for each type of barley.  Demand and
supply estimates are based on the 1991/92 marketing year.  
Results of the analysis may be summarized as follows.  Under base-case assumptions, which
are most favorable to the CWB (i.e., D=40 and M=0), single-desk selling of Canadian barley raises
Canadian producer revenue by C$95.8 million, relative to the multiple-seller solution.  However, if
tighter bounds apply to price differences or extra marketing costs apply, the effect of single-desk selling
is to lower Canadian producer revenue.  Under parameter values least favorable to the CWB (D=0
and M=16), Canadian producers lose C$160.0 million because of single-desk selling.     5See Johnson and Wilson (1994) for a more fully developed spatial model based on competitive
market equilibrium.    
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Given market conditions for the base year, single-desk selling in Canada appears to have the
effect of lowering U.S. feed barley prices while raising U.S. malting barley prices—both 6-row and
(especially) 2-row varieties.   This suggests that if Canada were to adopt a competitive marketing
system for barley, larger amounts of malting barley would be exported to the United States.  Based on
sensitivity analysis, if marketing costs in Canada are inflated by single-desk selling, this would also lend
some support to U.S. price levels.    
Some qualifications should be mentioned.  First, the analysis is based on results for one
marketing year, as relevant data for other years (i.e., average CWB transaction prices and quantities,
by market) were not available.  Important changes have occurred in recent years, including the growth
of feed demand in western Canada, the suspension of U.S. EEP subsidies for barley, and quality
problems in the U.S. malting barley crop—all of which could be expected to change price relationships
and trade patterns.  Second, the model lacks the kind of regional detail that may be critical to an
understanding of continental barley trade.5  Canadian feed barley demand is centered in Lethbridge,
while California represents the largest U.S. feed market.  U.S. malting capacity is spatially dispersed,
but with a concentration of plants in the Midwest.  With or without the CWB, flows of Canadian barley
into U.S. markets are likely to be determined by the costs of inter-regional grain movements, in addition
to price spreads at Canadian ports.  10




Maximum Price Difference (D), $/MT
40 30 20 10 0
 Canadian Producer Revenue: Deviations from Multiple Seller Solution (C$ Million)
0 95.8 95.5 84.5 55.6 5.1
4 58.3 58.0 46.6 16.6 !36.1
8 21.1 20.8 9.0 !22.2 !77.4
12 !15.8 !16.1 !28.3 !60.8 !118.4
16 !52.4 !52.4 !65.3 !99.1 !160.0
 Canadian Welfare: Deviations from Multiple Seller Solution (C$ Million)
0 25.9 26.4 25.6 20.7 10.5
4 12.1 12.6 11.8 !6.9 !3.2
8 !1.3 !0.8 !1.5 !6.3 !16.5
12 !14.2 !13.7 !14.5 !19.2 !29.3
16 !26.8 !26.3 !27.0 !31.7 !41.7
U.S. Welfare: Deviations from Multiple Seller Solution (C$ Million)
0 !3.1 !3.4 !4.0 !4.9 !5.9
4 !3.3 !3.6 !4.2 !5.1 !6.1
8 !3.4 !3.7 !4.3 !5.3 !6.3
12 !3.6 !3.9 !4.5 !5.4 !6.5
16 !3.7 !4.0 !4.6 !5.6 !6.7
CWB Share of Total Barley Supply (%)
0 35.7 35.7 35.3 34.5 33.0
4 34.7 34.7 34.4 33.5 31.9
8 33.8 33.8 33.4 32.5 30.8
12 32.9 32.9 32.5 31.5 29.8
16 31.9 31.9 31.5 30.5 28.711




Maximum Price Difference (D), $/MT
40 30 20 10 0
U.S. Barley Import Volume: Deviations from Multiple Seller Solution (‘000 MT)
0 0.1 !6.8 !20.8 !44.2 !83.4
4 !8.4 !15.3 !29.4 !53.4 !93.9
8 !16.8 !23.7 !37.9 !62.4 !104.4
12 !25.0 !31.9 !46.3 !71.3 !115.0
16 !33.0 !39.9 !54.5 !80.0 !125.5
U.S. Average Barley Import Price: Deviations from Multiple Seller Solution (C$/MT)
0 3.5 4.1 5.1 6.9 9.5
4 4.0 4.6 5.7 7.5 10.2
8 4.5 5.1 6.2 8.1 11.0
12 5.0 5.6 6.7 8.7 11.7
16 5.5 6.1 7.2 9.3 12.5
U.S. Barley Import Value: Deviations from Multiple Seller Solution (C$ Million)
0 1.9 1.3 !0.2 !1.9 !5.8
4 1.1 0.5 !0.7 !2.8 !6.6
8 0.3 !0.3 !1.5 !3.7 !7.9
12 !0.5 !1.0 !2.3 !4.6 !9.0
16 !1.2 !1.8 !3.1 !5.5 !10.012




Maximum Price Difference (D), $/MT
40 30 20 10 0
U.S. Feed Barley Price: Deviations from Multiple Seller Solution (C$/MT)
0 !2.6 !2.6 !2.5 !2.3 !1.5
4 !2.2 !2.2 !2.2 !2.0 !1.1
8 !1.9 !1.9 !1.9 !1.6 !0.8
12 !1.6 !1.6 !1.6 !1.3 !0.4
16 !1.3 !1.3 !1.3 !1.0 !0.1
U.S. 6-Row Malting Barley Price: Deviations from Multiple Seller Solution (C$/MT)
0 1.5 2.6 4.5 7.2 11.5
4 1.8 2.9 4.8 7.6 12.0
8 2.1 3.2 5.1 8.0 12.6
12 2.4 3.5 5.4 8.3 13.1
16 2.7 3.8 5.7 8.6 13.6
U.S. 2-Row Malting Barley Price: Deviations from Multiple Seller Solution (C$/MT)
0 22.8 22.8 23.3 24.9 23.3
4 23.1 23.1 23.6 25.2 23.8
8 23.4 23.4 23.9 25.6 24.3
12 23.6 23.7 24.2 25.9 24.8
16 23.9 23.9 24.5 26.2 25.313
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